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Showing posts with label Indian Defence Forum - Indian Army. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Indian Defence Forum - Indian Army. Show all posts

Thursday 1 January 2015

Serial Production Of Rustom In Hands Of Privte Co .. http://ift.tt/1xl30bM

India To Partner With Private Firms To Build Combat Drone



ym1r




Quote:




India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has invited private companies to partner with the government to develop and manufacture its first unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). The UCAV project, called Rustom-2 project was brought under the “Strategy India” category with funding by the government because the private companies had been lukewarm about building prototypes at their own expenses. In the "Strategy India" category, the government funds up to 80 percent in the development of the prototype, while the remaining 20 percent is funded by the selected private development agency, according to Defense News.



The development cost of Rustom-2 is estimated to be about $200 million. DRDO will fund 80 percent of the development and prototype cost for the Rustom-2 UCAV, and the remaining 20 percent will be paid by private Indian defense companies. This is the first time DRDO has invited private companies to develop prototypes under their guidance. In doing so, the Defence Ministry is reversing its decision to build Rustom-2 using only DRDO and state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).



India's domestic private sector defense companies including L&T, Tata Power SED,Mahindra Defence System, Data Patterns India Pvt. Ltd. and Bharat Forge Ltd are likely to be frontrunners to compete for the Rustom-2 project.



India began its Rustom-1 UAV in 2006 and initially wanted participation by domestic defense companies. However, after the MoD failed to give firm commitments of orders to the selected company, none of the defense companies from the private sector participated.



Source : India To Partner With Private Firms To Build Combat Drone



==============



This is a very good news ..





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Friday 26 December 2014

Boots, Bullets, Rifles: All In Short Supply For Army http://ift.tt/1vgwCBJ

NEW DELHI: The army is running low on ammunition, soldiers posted to freezing places like Siachen and Leh don't have boots or mosquito nets, and India has failed for over a decade to produce an assault rifle that meets the most basic requirements of the army.



These are some of the troubling highlights revealed by Parliament's standing committee on Defence, headed by the BJP's Major General BC Khanduri. The panel has 33 members from both houses of Parliament.



Based on information supplied by the Ministry of Defence, the committee has assessed the preparedness of the army in the winter session of Parliament which ends today.



The committee, in a report submitted to Parliament, has found that soldiers in high-altitude areas are short of nearly 2 lakh pairs of ankle leather boots; more than 13 lakh canvas boots are needed in the same areas, one lakh mosquito nets are wanted, and soldiers are waiting for 65,000 Balaclavas or masks to keep their faces warm.



The committee says the Defence Ministry has failed to furnish plausible information about how many soldiers have bullet-proof jackets; the members believe that "an important life saving device has not been purchased by the Ministry jeopardizing the lives of thousands of soldiers."



The committee has voiced its concern over the fact that while the Defence Ministry seems satisfied that equipment like night vision goggles are plentiful, the army has "an altogether different view." The report offers this indictment - "it appears that the Ministry is not taking the Army into confidence while doing its perspective planning."



The report warns clearly that the shortage of ammunition means "it would not be possible for the country to sustain a war for a longer period."



The committee states that the Defence Research and Development Organization or DRDO, tasked with developing technology for the military, has failed since 1982 to produce an acceptable INSAS rifle, the standard weapon of the army .



"The Committee finds it shocking that even years of expertise has not evolved DRDO to develop world class basic product like a rifle," its report says.

:shocked::shocked::shocked::lol::lol::lol:



Boots, Bullets, Rifles: All In Short Supply For Army





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Wednesday 24 December 2014

What happened to TATA Krestel? http://ift.tt/1rhj2Th

Sorry for starting such a stupid thread but what actually happened to Krestel? I couldn't find any news related to it. I was really excited about it. It would be great if someone could provide me some info.





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ABSENCE OF LEVEL PLAYING FIELD: T90 Vs Arjun: CAG report http://ift.tt/1CA2Ss7

The most significant setback to production of MBT Arjun was the change in requirements put forth by the Army in February 2007. The tanks produced by HVF, Avadi were to be issued to the Army after inspection at the factory site in the Joint Receipt Inspection by the representatives of HVF, DRDO and Army. The issued tanks were put through two trials - the Field Trial and the Accelerated usage-cum-reliability trials (AUCRT), by the Army. Joint Receipt Inspection was conducted (March 2005) for first five MBT Arjun manufactured (2003-04) in the pilot phase, one year after production. The inspection of the second lot of nine pilot MBT Arjun, took place in February 2007, two years after production. By 2007, 53 MBT had already been produced by HVF, Avadi. It was during this inspection in February 2007 that Army reported water ingress in the fighting compartment of tank while crossing shallow parts of a river and raised two additional requirements in the design of the MBT Arjun viz. zero level ingress of water in the fighting compartment and lead time for fording (time from tank’s entry into water to exit from water) to be minimised to 30 minutes.



We noticed that the corresponding benchmark fixed by the Army for T-90 tank was more relaxed, allowing 2.5 litres of water ingress. The requirement of zero level water ingress for medium fording was not stipulated in the Army’s requirements (GSQR of 1985) or in subsequent stages of development which had seen many changes in design. In fact, the Joint Action Plan (of Army and DRDO), in August 1999, had cleared the medium fording capability of MBT Arjun. This issue was also not raised in the Joint Receipt Inspection of the first batch of pilot MBT Arjun. The new requirements necessitated the DRDO to modify the design of the second lot of nine pilot MBT Arjun. The same got modified and were issued to Army by September 2007. The first lot of five pilot tanks was brought back from Army, got modified and issued to Army till October 2007. Balance 39 tanks of the bulk production were dismantled, reworked and issued to the Army in 2008-10. The whole task of dismantling and reassembly of 53 MBTs entailed an additional cost of Rs 84 lakh. The Ministry stated (May 2014) that modifications were considered essential to improve overall performance from user’s perspective. The reply undermines the impact of the modifications in derailing the production and issue of MBT Arjun, which was a significant factor that led to an import of T-90 tanks that cost Rs 4,913 crore in November 2007 as discussed in Paragraph 8.3.4. The reply also does not address why the benchmarks on MBT Arjun regarding water ingress and fording, were more stringent than the corresponding requirements on T-90 tank.



Medium fording was one of the eight instances we noticed, where Army placed benchmark of parameters on MBT Arjun which were more stringent in comparison to those placed on T-90 tanks. These are detailed in Annexure XIX. We could not assess the impact of these benchmarks on the performance of the two tanks from our scrutiny of the Report on comparative trials of MBT Arjun and T-90 tank (February/ March 2010- referred to in Paragraph 8.3.2.8 ). While we appreciate the Army’s quest for improving the quality of MBT Arjun, the imposition of more stringent parameters precluded a level playing field and more importantly, the inability to freeze the designs led to several changes in design, consequent delays in acceptance of MBT Arjun by the Army and in the overall, the production and issue of MBT Arjun.



___________________________



IMPACT OF 'EVOLVING' GSQRs

___________________________





Changes in design



Mention was made in Report No. 3 of 2006 of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India about the frequent changes in design leading to delay in development of MBT Arjun. The development of MBT prototype was to be completed by April 1982 but after going through several modifications in design, the prototype was cleared by the Army in 1998. Given this concern on several changes in design, the Scientific Advisor to the Raksha Mantri had confirmed (2004) in a note to the Ministry that the design for MBT stood frozen. This was, however, not the case. We found that 316 amendments to design of various assemblies were carried out even after freezing of the design and up to August 2010. The changes were mostly justified by the Ministry in its reply (May 2014) as necessitated for product improvement and modifications based on user’s feedback on quality problems. The reply does not take cognizance of the fact that even after clearing the production after acceptance of the prototype (1998), the designs continued to be re-worked for 12 years thereafter and frozen only in 2010.



_________________________________



ARJUN - T-90 COMPARATIVE TRIALS

_________________________________





Comparative field trials of MBT Arjun with T-90 tanks took place in February/ March 2010. Till such time, the Army had been consistently reporting quality problems in MBT Arjun; this was also reported to the Standing Committee on Defence (2007-08). The comparative trials were on four parameters viz. fire power, survivability, reliability and miscellaneous issues of the tank with weightage of 40, 35, 15 and 10 respectively. As per the trial report, MBT Arjun performed marginally better than the T-90 tank in accuracy and consistency of firepower. However, T-90 tank performed better in lethality and missile firing capability. The Army concluded (April 2010) that “Arjun had performed creditably and it could be employed both for offensive and defensive tasks with same efficacy of T-90 tank.” The Army also recommended upgrades to make the Arjun tank a superior weapon platform. We were informed (February 2014) that the Mark-II version of MBT Arjun was under trials by the Army and that it would include the upgrades recommended by the Army.



We found that the MBT Arjun and T-90 tank were not exactly comparable in missile firing ability; the higher score of T-90 tank was mainly due to missile firing ability which was not in the design of MBT Arjun. Barring missile firing ability, the scores of MBT Arjun and T-90 tank would be 25.77 and 24.50 respectively in firepower. In the overall comparative score, T-90 tank scored 75.01, marginally higher than MBT Arjun which scored 72.46, mainly because of higher score on missile firing ability of T-90 tank.



__________________



T-90 PRODUCTION

__________________





The Russian Firm, M/s Rosoboronexport (ROE) was expected to transfer the design details in the Transfer-of-Technology (ToT) documents by March 2003. The documents were in Russian; the Army/Ordnance Factories’ efforts to get translated documents from ROE, failed. The documents were received between September 2001 and January 2003 following which HVF, Avadi concluded four contracts between September 2003 and September 2006 for translation of the documents. The translation was completed by July 2007 after the expiry of scheduled delivery period of first batch of 50 indigenous tanks by 2006-07. In all, the translation of ToT documents took almost six years.



The Ministry stated (May 2014) that translation of critical documents for indigenous manufacturing was carried out with available resource of Russian translators at HVF and there was no delay in production due to pending translation. The reply is not acceptable because delay in translation of ToT documents had certainly impacted on the indigenous production of T-90 tanks as production could not commence without the availability of translated documents.



Non-receipt of design documents for critical assemblies



We found that ToT documents in respect of some critical assemblies were not transferred by the Russian manufacturer, ROE, even after lapse of 12 years as of July 2013. An important component was the gun system (including barrel) for which the design had not been received as of May 2014. In fact, the Ministry cited this issue as the main reason for slippage in indigenous production of T-90 tank.



________________________________



QUALITY PROBLEMS WITH THE T-90

________________________________



During March 2010 to November 2013, HVF received 45 defect reports (DRs) from the Army relating to minor and major defects in the indigenous T-90 tanks. The defects mainly pertained to failure of gear box and defects in auto/electrical portion of the tanks. A Working Group was proposed (March 2012) to address these deficiencies which was not formed. The HVF, Avadi constituted (November 2004) a Failure Review Board (FRB) at factory level to investigate the reasons for defects at the users end. The FRB discussed (September 2013) the major failures and recommended remedial measures.



Accordingly, HVF implemented:



• a process audit to eliminate non-conformances in assembling process;

• introduction of 100 per cent pre-fitment and component level inspection and additional quality assurance checks at local supplier’s premises;

• extensive trials of samples supplied by the local firms after introducing improvements and before their induction into regular production; and

• deputing of HVF’s teams to field locations to ensure technical and maintenance support to the users.



Ministry told us that the FRB was a quality tool which facilitated timely action on defects. The delay in discussion of the FRB (September 2013), even when

the Army was raising quality concerns since March 2010, was not however, commented upon by the Ministry.



___________________



PRODUCTION RATE

___________________



Arjun:



The Public Accounts Committee had urged (December 2003) the Ministry to utilize the infrastructural facilities optimally so that the desired volume of production of MBT Arjun would enable increase of the indigenous content to 55 per cent. The Ministry assured the Committee that a production level, initially of 300 MBT Arjun to be raised to 500 tank later, would reduce the import content to under 30 per cent.



However, barring the initial indent of 124 tanks, the Board did not receive any further indents for MBT Arjun. Production has come to standstill since 2009-10 and to that extent, capacity created at a cost of Rs 87 crore for annual production of 30 MBT Arjun awaits utilization against Ministry’s decision for fresh orders. Meanwhile, HVF, Avadi holds idle inventory of Rs 128 crore reflected as “Work-in-progress”, which remains unutilised in the absence of fresh orders. The cost per MBT Arjun was Rs 21 crore (2009-10), against which the import content was Rs 13 crore. This brings the level of indigenisation in MBT Arjun to 38 per cent only. The initial development project on MBT Arjun had envisaged that barring the engine, all components/assemblies would be indigenously produced. Problems in sourcing major assemblies other than engines have been discussed in Paragraph 8.3.2.6.



T-90:



The production of T-90 tank at HVF, Avadi was short of the indent of November 2004 for 300 tanks, by 75 tanks as of March 2013. Even as the production was underway against the first indent, the Army placed a second indent for 236 T-90 tanks in December 2013. Meanwhile, the Ministry sanctioned (September 2011) Rs 971 crore for capacity augmentation of T-90 tank production by March 2014. This was expected to raise the capacity of Ordnance Factories from 100 per cent to 140 per cent of T-90 tanks.



It is noteworthy that Rs 96 crore was sanctioned (February 2004) for creating production capacity for 100 T-90 tanks, whereas augmentation of capacity from 100 to 140 tanks is slated for Rs 971 crore, a ten times increase in estimation over a period of seven years. Reasons for the extraordinary increase were not provided by the Ministry, in its response of May 2014. As of March 2014, only an amount of Rs 17 crore had been spent on the augmentation project and in the revised schedule, the project is expected to be completed in December 2016. The Board appears to have put the augmentation plan on a slow track as of now.





Report no-35 of 2014



P.S: the report has been sourced from BR posted by Viv S





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Monday 22 December 2014

Sam Manekshaw: The Economist's obituary for this superlative soldier http://ift.tt/1zs62gj

Sam Manekshaw's obituary from The Economist dated July 3rd, 2008. Brief but informative and well worth reading. It gives some good insight into Sam "Bahadur" Manekshaw's character and personality.



Sam Manekshaw: Sam Manekshaw, soldier, died on June 27th, aged 94



The Economist



Sam Manekshaw

Sam Manekshaw, soldier, died on June 27th, aged 94



Jul 3rd 2008 | From the print edition



HIS most famous remark was not, strictly speaking, true. On the eve of the war with Pakistan in December 1971 that led to the creation of Bangladesh, India's prime minister, Indira Gandhi, asked her army chief, Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw, if he was ready for the fight. He replied with the gallantry, flirtatiousness and sheer cheek for which he was famous: “I am always ready, sweetie.” (He said he could not bring himself to call Mrs Gandhi “Madame”, because it reminded him of a bawdy-house.)



Yet General Manekshaw himself recounted a cabinet meeting in Mrs Gandhi's office in April 1971. To forestall secession, the Pakistani government had already cracked down in what was then East Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands of refugees had crossed the border into India. Mrs Gandhi wanted the army to invade Pakistan. General Manekshaw resisted. The monsoon, he pointed out, would soon start in East Pakistan, turning rivers into oceans. His armoured division and two infantry divisions were deployed elsewhere. To shift them would need the entire railway network, so the grain harvest could not be transported and would rot, bringing famine. And of his armoured division's 189 tanks, only 11 were fit to fight.



He was not, in other words, ready. But, as he put it, “There is a very thin line between being dismissed and becoming a field-marshal.” Mrs Gandhi rejected the resignation he offered, and acceded to the delay he wanted. His job, he told her, was to fight to win. In December he did, cutting through the Pakistani army like a knife through butter, and taking Dhaka within two weeks. Quibblers later noted that this was not one of his original war aims. He had the most important attribute of any successful general: good luck.



That was not the only time he threatened to quit. Mrs Gandhi once questioned him about rumours that he was plotting a coup. In response, he asked if she wanted his resignation on grounds of mental instability. Yet if she and other politicians were in awe of him as a professional soldier and grateful for his lack of political ambition, his men loved him for his willingness to take on their civilian bosses and stand up for the army's interests.



He had shown this in the Indian army's darkest hour, the abject defeat in 1962 by China. Already a general, he had the previous year quarrelled with India's defence minister, V.K. Krishna Menon, about national security. He was vindicated when the Chinese army swatted aside Indian resistance and briefly occupied what is now the state of Arunachal Pradesh. Mr Menon resigned. General Manekshaw was rushed to the front to rally the demoralised troops. His first order was: “There will be no withdrawal without written orders and these orders shall never be issued.”



General Manekshaw was able to demand courage from his soldiers because his own was not in doubt. Known as Sam “Bahadur”, or Sam the Brave, an honorific given him by the Indian army's Gurkhas, the first of his five wars was for the British in Burma, where he was seriously wounded. Assuming he would die, an English general pinned his own Military Cross on Captain Manekshaw's chest, since the medal could not be awarded posthumously. Another story has it that a surgeon was going to give up on his bullet-riddled body, until he asked him what had happened and got the reply, “I was kicked by a donkey.” A joker at such a time, the surgeon reckoned, had a chance.





Stiff but hairy



There was something of British military tradition in his stiff upper lip, the lavish handlebar moustache in which he cloaked it, the dapper little embellishments to his uniform and his partiality for Scotch whisky. Yet he was born into a very particular and tight-knit community: India' s small and dwindling Parsi minority, which has produced a disproportionate number of leading Indians, such as the members of the Tata and Godrej business dynasties. Sam Manekshaw was another Parsi overachiever. He was the first of only two field-marshals ever created in the army.



Yet his retirement since 1973 was not one long bask in glory. Former deputies felt he had monopolised the credit for various victories. Then last year his name was linked to bizarre allegations, by the son of a former Pakistani president, against an unnamed brigadier who had once sold Indian war plans to Pakistan. All nonsense, said those who knew him. Already in hospital, General Manekshaw was in part shielded from controversy.



After his death, anger at the slur, and at the lack of proper honour for one of India's true heroes, rumbled on. The prime minister, along with the army, navy, and air-force chiefs, all missed his funeral—which was a modest one held in Tamil Nadu in the south, not a grand one in the capital. His friends grumbled that even foreigners such as Lord Mountbatten were afforded greater respect in death. Bangladesh, however, paid grateful tribute to his part in the nation's foundation.



He too might well have been disappointed that his obsequies were not grander. His last words were “I'm OK”, though he had rehearsed a better line nearly 37 years earlier. For death at least, the brave soldier had indeed shown himself “always ready”.





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Saturday 13 December 2014

OROP: Pension promise in peril? http://ift.tt/1yOUp2E



Quote:




Pension promise in peril?



Military veterans claim babus are thwarting PM Modi's poll pledge of one-rank-one-pension by inflating its cost estimates



Roman emperor Augustus started the tradition of military pensions in 13 BC, when every legionary who had fought 20 years for Rome was guaranteed a pension for-life. It set the bar for modern armies, and independent India continued the British tradition of financially privileging military service until the mid-1970s, when soldiers were paid more than civilian bureaucrats, in service and after retirement. All that changed with the Third Pay Commission, which brought military salaries in line with civil services, and while soldiers have long complained about political control over the military in independent India mutating into bureaucratic control, a row over the NDA's promise for one-rank-one-pension (OROP) for military veterans is raising questions about the government's ability to translate its intent into action.



Fifteen months after Narendra Modi first demanded it immediately after being anointed the BJP's PM candidate, 10 months after the UPA government granted it, five months after NDA's finance minister Arun Jaitley confirmed it and almost two months after the PM told soldiers in Siachen that it was his "destiny that onerank-one pension has been fulfilled", military veterans are questioning why the promise has still not been implemented.



Number games



Put simply, OROP means that every pension-eligible soldier who retires in a particular rank deserves the same pension, irrespective of date of retirement. Currently, soldiers who left the armed forces more recently receive more than those who did earlier, because successive pay commissions hiked salaries. Two days after he was anointed BJP's PM-candidate in September 2013, Modi vehemently supported the OROP demand at a veterans' rally in Rewari. With roughly 12 lakh veterans also constituting a huge vote-bank, UPA government approved the demand in February 2014, and it was reaffirmed by NDA in July, when finance minister Arun Jaitley specifically provisioned Rs 1,000 crore in his 2014-15 budget (within an overall defence pensions budget of Rs 51,000 crore). Yet, it remains stuck in bureaucratic wrangling.



Pension promise in peril? - The Times of India



It will never get resolved so long as the petty minions in the bureaucracy are active like rats in the larder.



Some issue they will throw up that will put the spanner in the works.




Quote:




The bureaucrat ensure that they are getting the right pension through the cunning handle of 'non functional upgrade' (NFU), applicable to all officers of the All India Group A Services, wherein it is a 'pay promotion' to draw higher pay than their ranks, without actually being promoted. Hence, on retirement get the benefits of the higher rank when actually not promoted to the same.



Only 0.8% officers of the defence forces make it to the rank of Maj Gen after 28 years of service, compared with a much higher rate of civil servants who are eligible to the rank of Joint Secretaries with 19 years of service.



This NFU is OROP for civil servants through the back door is what Maj Navdeep Singh a campaigner says.



This in quotes is what is stated in the TOI print version. (paraphrased)





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Thursday 11 December 2014

Indian Made Life Saving Infrastructure For Infantry http://ift.tt/1uth7qG

Life Saving Infrastructure For Infantry



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The objective of this thread to gather around Infrastructure items In India for Infantry defense ....



For example :



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Etc ..





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Live Saving Infrastructure Made In India For Infantry http://ift.tt/16aWkmx

Live Saving Infrastructure Made In India For Infantry



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The objective of this thread to gather around Infrastructure items In India for Infantry defense ....





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Comet Life Partners Zero Motivation http://ift.tt/1yU9izD

The Pyramid Wild Comet Life Partners Zero Motivation She's Beautiful When She's Angry Inherent Vice Exodus Gods And Kings Top Five Free The Nippl.





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Tuesday 9 December 2014

Did Narendra Modi undermine the Army's authority? http://ift.tt/1ItW3Kj

Jammu and Kashmir rally: Did Narendra Modi undermine the Army's authority? | Latest News & Updates at Daily News & Analysis



In Srinagar, campaigning for his party BJP, Prime Minister Narendra Modi tried to play the role of a senior statesman much in the mould of former PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Stressing that he would repay the love of the people of Kashmir, Modi said that their development would be on the top of his agenda.



But while striking a sombre, conciliatory tone with the people of Kashmir, Modi said, "It is the first time that the Army owned up to the mistake of gunning down two innocent youth in a press conference and action has been taken against those who opened fire. This had not happened in the last 30 years. Ye Modi sarkar ka kaamal hai. Ye mere nek iradon ka saboot hai." (This is the wonder of Modi Government. It is a proof of my honest intentions)​.



While Narendra Modi probably tried to give the message that his administration will have a humane attitude towards the people of Kashmir, while driving home his point, he also undermined the authority of the Army in a way. The Indian Army is an apolitical body and has its own justice system. But Modi indicated that they got their act together only after he came to power. This is a dangerous suggestion to make, fraught with possibly dire consequences. Does the statement mean that in cases where justice was not done in time, there was a lack of political will or that a politician had a 'galaat irada'?



According to an ex-Army officer speaking on the condition of anonymity, the Army justice system is completely independent of the executive and bureaucracy. Hence, PM Modi may have just jumped the gun with his statement. Another line of thought is that Modi may have implied to say that acche din have generally begun after his government came to power. But PM Modi's claim is still controversial if the timeline of the incidents in the Machil fake encounter case is considered. As early as December 25, 2013 the Army had ordered a court martial of five Army men, which was nearly five months before Modi came to power. So the Army's prompt action in the Chattergam incident (which he most probably referred to) where two innocent youth were gunned down, wasn't the first of its kind. All that can be said is that the then Defence Minister Arun Jaitley promptly condemned the incident to prevent the incident from going out of control.



Sure, the government was seen as being assertive and reaching out to the people. But by saying that justice was done only because of his government, Modi has probably exceeded his brief. Jammu and Kashmir is a complicated place, with a perennial tension between the state, Army and a section of the people. There are forces from outside the border trying to use any possible misstep by the Indian establishment. The Army works in extremely difficult conditions, often treading on thin ice. Thus we have to be doubly cautious. Semantics matter as much as real politick does. Winning Jammu and Kashmir for his party, the BJP, is obviously a prime concern for Narendra Modi, but maintaining the sanctity of the armed forces trumps that, ten out of ten days.





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Monday 8 December 2014

Maruti Gypsy gets repeat order from Army, 4,100 http://ift.tt/12Dlvvy

The Indian Army has placed an order for over 4,100 units of the Maruti Gypsy, the biggest order for the car till date, giving a new lease of life to one of the earliest sports utility vehicles (SUV) that has evolved little since its launch in 1985. The previous order from the Army was for around 1,000 vehicles in 2012. The current order was placed three months ago, and Maruti has already delivered half the number to the Army, while the remaining would be delivered in around four months. The Army’s first order for the Gypsy was in 1991, and since then, Maruti Suzuki India has sold 31,000 of the vehicles to the force. “Army has some specific requirements and they need additional accessories. We tweak those specifications even though it involves a lot of effort on our part in terms of engineering and production. We are glad they have shown trust in us with repeat orders,” said RS Kalsi, executive director and head of domestic sales and marketing at Maruti Suzuki India.



The Gypsy is customised for the Army with special accessories. A source said that the cars have convoy lights, which emits a green ray that the soldiers follow at the time of black-out in a war situation. Among other things, the cars are also provided with hooks in the rear for towing military equipment such as large guns and inside for mounting weapons. There has also been demand from the Air Force, Navy, paramilitary forces and BSF but the numbers from them have been significantly lower as compared to that from the Army. “They order 50-100 vehicles in batches,” said Kalsi. The 4-wheel drive, petrol Gypsy has been left out by the competition in the SUV market. Several factors have been responsible — such as the lack of a diesel variant. Sales of the model over the last few years have been insignificant, but company officials say that the Gypsy is still popular with sports enthusiasts and rally drivers.



Having seen little change in terms of appearance, the Gypsy has lost out among current SUV buyers who are torn between compact stylish vehicles and big and powerful models with specs to match. The car, however, seems to hold some appeal in the Bollywood. A company source said that actor Sohail Khan recently bought a Gypsy that was fully customised for him and drove it in the Himalayan Rally. Another Bollywood customer was John Abraham who also got his fully customised. – See more at: Maruti Gypsy gets repeat order from Army, 4,100 this time | The Indian Express :lol::lol::lol::lol:



Maruti Gypsy gets repeat order from Army, 4,100 this time | idrw.org





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Sunday 7 December 2014

The Indian army is fast losing its morale http://ift.tt/1w4piN9



Quote:






In the line of fire



- The Indian army is fast losing its morale




Brijesh D. Jayal



8edittop1

Unhappy lives



Whilst all eyes have been on how the new government steers the legislative agenda during its first full parliamentary session, it is what the new defence minister has said in answers to members' questions within the first few days of the session that should have come as a bolt from the blue to the lawmakers.



Reportedly, the Indian Air Force has lost 32 aircraft in the last three years along with 13 persons (presumably all pilots) in accidents this year alone. The navy has suffered 24 major and minor mishaps between January 2011 and November 2014, including the sinking of submarine INS Sindhurakshak last year and a torpedo recovery vessel just recently. Together, these have resulted in the loss of lives of 22 officers and sailors, with four still missing.



The bad news, unfortunately, is not limited to these operational losses alone. It extends to the sensitive and vital domain of morale, reflected in the number of suicides. For the period commencing 2011, the army has lost 362 soldiers, the IAF 76 airmen and the navy 11 sailors, all to suicides. In addition, during this period, there have been 10 cases of fratricide within the army. Further statistics also point to an alarming shortage of officers in the fighting ranks of the armed forces - of lieutenant colonel and below - with the army short of 7,764, the navy 1,499 and the air force 357 officers.



The muted reaction to these revelations from amongst our lawmakers, the political pundits or indeed the loud electronic media is symptomatic of a deeper malaise. It is difficult to fathom whether this neglect stems from the gravity of this state of affairs not being fully absorbed or our antipathy in general to matters pertaining to the armed forces and national security. Either way, the inevitable conclusion is that India does not need external enemies to defeat its armed forces; collectively, our institutions are doing that work for them pretty well.



To fathom this decline, the proverbial fish rotting from the head comes to mind and even a cursory look at the entire edifice of national security would reveal that Parliament, which stands supreme, rarely spends time on substantial debates on civil-military relations, national security or the state of the armed forces. Successive governments have paid little heed to recommendations of more than one committee to revamp the archaic higher defence organization and have not been held to account by the legislature.



In spite of facing two nuclear neighbours with whom we have unresolved border issues and many counter-insurgency commitments within the country, the government's rules of business place the responsibility of defence of the country on the shoulders of the defence secretary. For all practical purposes, the armed forces headquarters continue to be treated as subordinate and 'attached offices' of the ministry of defence, notwithstanding a recent cosmetic re-designation to 'integrated' headquarters.



Next in the pecking order come the service chiefs who, to those they command, are not just their lawful commanders but embodiment of all that the profession stands for. The respect and honour accorded to the chiefs by the nation adds to the izzat and iqbal of those under their command. It is this pride that contributes to an intangible quality called morale, a quality vital for the success of any fighting force. Three recent examples of how we have treated our commanders would actually make for enlightening case studies in national governance for those of our leaders who aspire to govern and those administrators who, in our warped management of defence, exercise total control over the armed forces with no accountability.



When the VVIP helicopter scandal broke, one amongst the many caught in the slipstream was an erstwhile air chief with a supposed allegation that he had altered the technical requirements to the benefit of the supplier. Without pre-judging the outcome of any investigation, the ministry of defence should have publicly clarified in unambiguous terms that within the system and processes, no single person, irrespective of rank or status, can alter such requirements and that due processes were indeed followed in the case in question.



Recently, a navy chief resigned accepting moral responsibility for a series of mishaps in his service. The unholy haste with which his resignation was accepted and the curt ministry of defence announcement, shorn of the courtesy of expressing regret and recognizing his distinguished service to the nation, lends credence to a view expressed by a predecessor that the government had driven him into resigning by attacking him and demanding explanations. Indeed, in a television interview recently, the erstwhile chief rued with a smile that even he was surprised at the instant acceptance of his resignation by the defence minister.



While these cases relate to ineptness and insensitivity in the way the service chiefs are treated, another case appears to have an element of politics thrown in. A former army chief had run-ins with the government prior to retirement and joined Anna Hazare's movement within months of shedding his uniform. That he was taken into the fold of the principal Opposition party prior to elections, leaves unanswered questions about the line demarcating politics and the military. Should a chief or a commander not wait for a healthy cooling-off period before joining high-profile civil movements or politics? Should political parties themselves not follow a code of ethics of not inviting these men until after a respectable cooling-off period?



The above examples are intended to provide a backdrop to higher defence management issues, the proverbial head of fish, contributing to the deteriorating state of morale in the armed forces. The following examples would illustrate the slippery slope we are encountering at the very sharp end.



The example of Jammu and Kashmir is a case in point. It is no secret that an unfriendly neighbour continues its proxy war with the avowed objective of inflicting a thousand cuts. It is also a fundamental military principle that use of the military in aid of civil authorities should be kept to the barest minimum because prolonged use in a police role dilutes its primary ethos. Whilst the army unfailingly and faithfully continues to do a job not to its liking or choosing, it is often the target of not only separatists, but also political parties and human rights activists.



In the unfortunate incident of the killing of two civilians at an army checkpoint recently, the army has stated that the car did not stop at two checkpoints and broke through the third barrier when it was shot at, killing two occupants. The resulting disturbances and the temptation to use this issue to denigrate the army, and perhaps score electoral brownie points, certainly seem to have got the army on the back foot.



A reputed national daily in an editorial patronizingly asked "Why do soldiers patrolling civilian areas in Kashmir shoot to kill, so easily? The answer, in five letters, is AFSPA." Dramatic though this statement is, perhaps the writer could have asked an even more relevant question. Why is it that areas of the state continue to be considered "disturbed areas" by the civil administration even after decades? Further, if the writer had taken the trouble to study case histories of the 362 army suicides that the defence minister referred to, it would perhaps have emerged that the stress of prolonged deployment in counter-insurgency duties is a contributing factor to this stressed reaction, resulting in the lack of judgment and collateral damage.



Clearly, the army found itself on the back foot and after an inquiry, indicted nine soldiers including a junior commissioned officer for this shooting. But the larger questions remain. The political leadership must ponder why it has put military men on counter-insurgency duties for such a prolonged period? And the army must ponder whether it expects its soldiers to be quick or dead when they are faced with split second life and death decisions in judging a friend from a foe?



This example is not to be mixed with cases where either human rights violation has taken place or fake encounters committed. These are cases of lack of discipline and need to be dealt with firmly, counter-insurgency or not. The army, more than any other institution, will make sure that lack of discipline is not tolerated.



The last straw is a recent report revealing that some wives of army aviation pilots have formed an army wives' agitation group with the purpose of wanting, what they consider, the archaic Chetak and Cheetah helicopters to be phased out as there have been 191 crashes involving these in the past two decades with 294 fatalities. Reportedly, they even have plans to meet the defence minister and the prime minister. This is a new low in the history of national security.



That the armed forces have been made the whipping boys of all and sundry is all too obvious. That this is now beginning to affect the fighting potential of the armed forces is more than evident from what was tabled by the defence minister in Parliament. What though is disturbing is a trend that has never been in evidence in the past - the hint, however remote, that some among the uniformed fraternity are beginning to question their commitment to unlimited liability in the line of duty. Clearly the new defence minister, the prime minister and Parliament have their task cut out. Time is a luxury they can ill afford.



The author is a retired airmarshall of the Indian Air Force

In the line of fire




The state of the military, the defence control structure, the abject ignorance of the politicians of the nuts and bolts of the military and hence leaving it to the Defence Secretary to control the Forces, and the Nation not understanding the gravity of the situation.





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Army camp in Uri under attack, several personnel killed http://ift.tt/1ALO5ah

TV reports say that 3-4 gunmen have attacked the field artillery regiment camp in Uri.

3 soldiers, 2 policemen and 2 militants dead as of now.





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Young army officers blame commanders for Uri debacle on social media http://ift.tt/1BqeiOL

Young army officers blame commanders for Uri debacle on social media



Terrorist2Brations

Pre-cooked meals with Urdu markings recovered from six dead terrorists who attacked an army post in Uri



A day after eight army soldiers, including an officer, died in a militant strike on a military camp near Uri, in Jammu & Kashmir, anger is bubbling amongst junior officers who say over-cautious commanders have tied their hands.



In a WhatsApp message that is racing through army networks, the Uri debacle has been blamed on tight operational restrictions allegedly imposed after two Kashmiri boys were mistakenly shot dead on November 3 by soldiers manning a check point near Chattergam village, in Anantnag district of south Kashmir.



Then, in a swift attempt to quell public outrage, the army had ordered an inquiry that found nine soldiers of 53 Rashtriya Rifles culpable. Northern army commander, Lieutenant General DS Hooda, publicly admitted the army had made a mistake.



Days later, on November 13, an army court martial sentenced five soldiers, including two officers, to life imprisonment for killing three innocent Kashmiris in a fake encounter in the Macchil sector of north Kashmir in 2010.



In the bitter WhatsApp message, an unidentified officer has directly held his top commanders responsible for the Uri debacle.



“As per reports, soldiers on the sentry duty on the army camp [at Uri], did not fire upon the approaching terrorist vehicle due to caution imposed on them after the Anantnag incident (sic)”, says the WhatsApp message.



The message goes on: “When [the] Anantnag incident took place last month, corps commander of 15 corps and Army Commander of Northern Command had both called it a mistake… Should not the Army Cdr (commander) and Corps cdr (commander) consider resigning for this goof up (sic).”



"Now, what do they have to say? They had betrayed their own soldiers, who became cautious and the result is for everyone to see.”



Highlighting a worrying faultline, the message demands (capitals in original): “GENERALS SHOULD STOP PLAYING TO [THE] GALLERY AND MIND THEIR OWN BUSINESS AND ALLOW SOLDIERS TO DO THEIR JOB.”



Such bitterness is growing in combat unit and sub-unit commanders, who are caught between senior officers’ demands to “deliver results”, i.e. to kill militants; while at the same time uphold the human rights of locals, most of whom sympathise with militants, if not actively support them.



The army is scrambling to counter this unprecedented “social media” crisis. While nobody is speaking on the record, Business Standard learns the army is responding on social media, putting out a detailed account of the Uri incident. The aim is to prove that the militants benefited from laxity rather than from imposed restraints.



Says Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain, a highly regarded former corps commander in Srinagar: “It is unfair to blame top commanders for demanding restraint. Every officers knows exactly what restraint implies; and it does not restrict legitimate use of force against militants.”



Neither do accounts of the Uri strike support the view that soldiers’ were operationally restrained. The attack began at 3 a.m., a time when civilian movement is totally banned and every stranger is considered suspicious.



Senior commanders in Kashmir have stoutly resisted pleas to lift the Disturbed Areas notification from large parts of J&K, which means the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1990 (AFSPA) would no longer apply in those areas. Even so, the army hierarchy is increasingly intolerant of human rights violations.



The WhatsApp message bitterly states: “We ought to accept such mistakes when we deploy the army for restoration of the situation. Everyone must understand the real purpose of AFSPA. It is meant to cover unintentional mistakes made by soldiers in the course of the performance of their duty.”



The WhatsApp message strongly reflects the soldiers’ viewpoint that they are doing a thankless job for seniors, leaders and a public that neither understands nor sympathises with the army.



The officer writes: “Why does not this nation and its leaders understand the nuances of this ‘Designer war’ heaped upon India by Pakistan since 1989? Unfortunately, even most military minds, both serving and retired, have failed to understand the reality of this war. It has nothing to do with 'Law and Order'; it is war, Sir! Most important, it is for Generals to understand and grasp its characteristics and stop reacting to civilian hue and cry (sic).”



Broadsword





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Thursday 4 December 2014

15 Amazing Facts About The Indian Army That Will Make You Proud http://ift.tt/1FX5VKm

15 Amazing Facts About The Indian Army That Will Make You Proud



amazingfactsabouttheindianarmythatwillmakeyouproudh 1417087321 980x457



With sponsored terrorism from some neighboring countries and incursion threats from others, problems of illegal immigration and so many other internal conflicts and disasters - it is thanks to the Indian Army that India still maintains its status quo loud and proud. We can never thank our Army enough for what they do – and these 15 facts will earn your respect for them further.

amazingfactsabouttheindianarmythatwillmakeyouproud1 1417087349



This is where Pakistan and India have fought intermittently since April 1984. Both countries maintain a permanent military presence in the region at a height of over 6,000 m.

amazingfactsabouttheindianarmythatwillmakeyouproud2 1417087383



The Indian Army is a voluntary service and although a provision for military conscription exists in the Indian constitution, it has never been imposed.

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The Indian Army’s High Altitude Warfare School (HAWS) is one of the most elite military training centers in the world and is frequented by Special Ops teams from the US, UK and Russia. US Special Forces trained at HAWS before their deployment during the invasion of Afghanistan.

amazingfactsabouttheindianarmythatwillmakeyouproud4 1417087433



The Battle of Longewala was fought in December 1971 between India and Pakistan, in which just 120 Indian soldiers with one jeep mounted with a M40 recoilless rifle held the fort against 2000 Pakistani soldiers backed by 45 tanks and one mobile infantry brigade. Despite being so heavily outnumbered, the Indian soldiers held their ground throughout the night and with the help of the Air Force, were able to completely rout the aggressors.



15 Amazing Facts About The Indian Army That Will Make You Proud





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Saturday 29 November 2014

Death of a Hero http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/indian-army/65474-death-hero.html

25sandeep1

An NSG commando at the spot where the terrorist who shot Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan had positioned himself.



26/11 will always be remembered for the courage displayed by our security forces in overcoming the siege at the Taj Mahal hotel, Oberoi and Chabad House in Mumbai.



For the elite National Security Guard, which was called in to defeat the terrorists, fighting a battle in unfamiliar terrain came with a heavy price attached: The loss of two commandos, Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan at the Taj and Havildar Gajender Singh Bisht at Chabad House.



In his book Black Tornado, The 3 Sieges of Mumbai, journalist Sandeep Unnithan, who has been covering internal security for India Today magazine, unearths fresh details of the NSG operation, the elite force's epic resolve to win the battle.



At 1 am, on 28 November, Major Sandeep led his hit team, Sunil Jodha, Manoj Kumar, Babu Lal and Kishor Kumar through the piece de resistance of the Taj: The grand staircase -- a single, long staircase split into two like a Y.



At the landing between the two arms, sat a garlanded bronze bust of Jamshetji Nusserwanji Tata, founder of the Tata business empire and the man who built the Taj in 1903. Tata wore a phenta, the traditional Parsi black cap, and stared sternly into the distance. Behind the bust was a large entrance to the Palm Lounge that had long since been boarded up and covered by a huge mirror.



The staircase was pitch dark. The fire brigade had poured thousands of litres of water at the fires in the Taj. The water now seeped down the floors and dripped into the cavernous staircase area. The sound of dripping water added to the eeriness of the place. It was like entering a smoky jungle cave.



A thick red carpet with floral patterns was fastened to the steps by thick brass stair rods. The carpet was soggy and oozed water, which meant that the commandos' boots made a gentle squishing sound as they walked up the stairs towards the bust.



As the hit team walked up the stairs, gun flashes lit up the darkened stairway. The terrorists were firing at them from above. Unni signalled Sunil and Babu Lal, to head up left and towards the heavy brown doors that led to the Palm Lounge and the ballroom. They were to throw grenades and clear the Palm Lounge. The two commandos walked up gently, weapons drawn. They took positions on either side of the doorway. The doors were shut.



Just then, a grenade flew out of the darkness. It bounced on the carpeted staircase and exploded. An AK-47 rattled from above. Bullets drilled the staircase. They punched into the walls around the doorway, digging into the stone and plaster. The glass around Tata's bust shattered. It was an ambush.



The terrorists were on high ground. They had seen the silhouettes of the NSG men. And they had waited. The atrium was now a kill zone. Major Unnikrishnan moved under the cover fire provided by his two commandos.



Another grenade sailed out from one of the top floors and exploded on the granite floor. Over 5,000 ball bearings from the grenade blasted a deadly pattern around the staircase. Sunil Jodha's body was riddled with bullets and splinters. He collapsed and rolled back down the stairs to the foot of the bust.



The commandos took cover and blasted away at their unseen enemy. Blood oozed around Sunil's body. Two bullets had entered his chest. One had been trapped by the ceramic rifle plate on his bulletproof jacket. His left arm was lacerated with steel ball bearings. 'I'm going to lose my arm,' he thought to himself as he lay prone on the floor.



Unni rushed back to Sunil. He saw blood streaming out of his buddy's wounds. 'Take him back for first aid,' he hissed at Babu Lal. In a flash he had gone back up towards the Palm Lounge, alone.



Unni swung up his MP5 and fired a burst across the atrium. The bullets hammered into the wall. Then he bounded up the stairs leading to the other set of doors opening into the Palm Lounge. It was a terribly risky move because he didn't have a buddy to cover him.



If he broke contact, the cat-and-mouse game would start all over again. He decided to outflank the terrorists. His running shoes made no sound. He could see the outlines of the large wicker chairs and tables strewn before him.



He felt his bandolier. He only had a white flash-bang grenade left. He flicked the pin off the grenade and flung it into the lounge. The grenade exploded with a loud crack that rattled the windows. Unni dashed in. He then fired a burst at the sea-facing windows. Clear!



He looked around the wall. A brown ornate grille in front of him covered the ballroom like metal foliage. The ballroom was his target. He held his MP5 in front of him as he swiftly charged down the corridor. To his left was a small alcove with two sofas and a circular granite tabletop. There was a flash from beneath the table and two near-simultaneous sounds -- the rattle of an AK-47 and the burst of an MP5.





25sandeep2

The Palm Lounge where Major Unnikrishnan was killed in a firefight with the terrorists.



Sierra Five, Sierra Five, this is Sierra One, come in. Over.'



Colonel Sheoran's message pulsed aimlessly through the airwaves around the Taj. There was no response. 'Perhaps he is in close contact, he won't speak...' Brigadier Sisodia said. The NSG rapidly cleared the charred southern end of the hotel, the Sea Lounge on the second floor. NSG commandos now guarded all the vital access routes into the northern end of the hotel.



By 3 am on Friday, 28 November, Major Kandwal's weary team had cleared all twenty-one floors of the Taj Tower. Kandwal handed the Tower back to the Mumbai police. Four hours later, all the rooms in both hotels were cleared of potential hostages. Now the hunt for the terrorists would begin. But where was Major Unnikrishnan?



Sheoran climbed up to the fourth floor and peered down the grand staircase into the atrium below. Bodies, limp and contorted, still dotted the galleries around the atrium. 'Saabji, look at the bodies,' one of his commandos, Havildar Digh Ram, whispered. The bodies were bloating. It had been over thirty-six hours since the terrorists had struck. The air was thick, foul and nauseating. It smelt of putrefying bodies and rotting food. The bodies could not be removed till the NSG did their 'Render Safe Procedure' to clear booby traps. For that to begin, the buildings had to be cleared of terrorists.



Sheoran, however, was searching for Unni. He looked closely at the first floor where they had made contact with the terrorists. It had four doors. One of those doors, diagonally opposite the bust, was open. The door led into the hotel. Perhaps, Unni had gone looking for the terrorists in the opposite direction.



At 6.30 am Jasrotia's radio on the roof of the residential building crackled urgently. 'Sierra Six, this is Sierra One, come to Op Centre. Over.' Sheoran needed more hands to augment the search for the missing major. The size of the teams was reduced. Jasrotia was given two hit teams and tasked to move and search the first floor.



He would start from the kitchen area where Major John, a newly inducted officer, had taken position. Sheoran's officers repeatedly dialled Unni's mobile phone. It was switched off. If Unni was in the hotel, he was being very quiet.



At around 9.30 am, Major Kandwal and Major Jasrotia retraced Unni’s steps. They advanced as a two-man buddy pair. Jasrotia aimed his MP5 in front.



Kandwal, covering the rear, aimed his MP5 above him. A black figure lay prone on the marble floor, face up.



Unni! His left leg was folded under his right. His right arm lay outstretched, left arm across his chest. His body was riddled with bullets and lay in a sticky black pool of blood. All the bullets had been fired from the left. The fatal round had pierced his head from the lower jaw and exited the skull. His walkie-talkie lay two feet away from his head. It was neatly placed on the floor, upright, switched off. The ring of a flash-bang grenade pin hung around his thumb.



25sandeep3

NSG commandos enter the Taj lobby.



It didn't take long to figure out what happened. The terrorist had been hiding in the alcove behind the statue, crouched under the table and two sofas. He had shot the lone Black Cat as he charged down the corridor. Unni had taken a burst from an AK-47. His body had twisted around as it hit the floor. The terrorist had taken his weapons and retreated northwards into the hotel.



But the officer had not gone down without a fight. He had instinctively fired at his assailant. Bullets from Unni's MP5 were embedded on the wall and the wooden lattice. A bloodied running shoe of a terrorist lay nearby. A trail of blood led towards the ballroom. Unni had wounded the terrorist.



Kandwal reached for his mobile phone and not his walkie-talkie. No one could know that an officer was down. 'Sir, Unni no more. Confirmed.' There was a brief pause. Colonel Sheoran's voice did not betray his anguish, 'OK. Wait. I'll send someone.'



Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan became the NSG's first officer to die in combat. His death shook the 51 SAG. It was the death of a beloved colleague and a reckoning of their own mortality.



Unni's death slowed the operation at the Taj. The NSG brass reassessed their moves. They became cautious. They would not waste any more lives. His death was, however, kept away from the troops. Sheoran did not want it to affect their morale.



Major Unnikrishnan's last charge pushed the terrorists towards the restaurants at the northern end of the Taj. They could run no further. Sheoran was determined not to let Unni's death go in vain. He moved his snipers to cover the north wing. Sheoran called down Captain Dalal and his shooters from their perch atop the Yacht Club.



Dalal instinctively knew something was wrong.



He felt a cloud over the command centre at the Taj, but asked no questions. The CO had orders for him.



Dalal was to take his two-man sniper team into a fire brigade sky lift. The Mumbai Fire Brigade's telescoping articulated platform was critical in rescuing hostages from the upper floors of the Taj. Now it would be used as a sniper perch. The platform was positioned on the road just 25 metres away from the northern corner of the hotel. Dalal and Mustafa Pathan clambered on board.



The six-square-foot cage had just enough place for three persons including the operator who manoeuvred the platform. The snipers took their bulletproof vests off and placed it in front of them to create an improvised shield. Sheoran directed Dalal to ensure the terrorists would not target the media, which had been moved to the far corner of the Gateway of India. The PSG-1 gun barrel now aimed at the Taj, wary eyes peered through its rubber-lined Hensoldt-scope, looking for the terrorists.



Next, Sheoran directed his teams to move into the ballroom.



The commandos tiptoed in. It was pitch dark. They warily tore down the thick drapes that covered the windows and began searching the room. It took them nearly five hours to complete the search. The ballroom was clean.



Death of a Hero: How Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan was ambushed - Rediff.com India News



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One wonder, if things like night vision goggles,thermal gun sight ,throw bot ,corner shot,ballistic shield and many others would have made difference between life and death.



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stock photo the indian flag and the silhouette of a soldier s military salute 106856912





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Brain-dead soldier gifts life to others, kin donate his organs http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/indian-army/65471-brain-dead-soldier-gifts-life-others-kin-donate-his-organs.html

Chandigarh: Nov 29, 2014, DHNS:



Military doctors at the Western Command Hospital in Chandimandir here have carried out their first ever successful multi-organ transplant harvest from a brain-dead donor.



The next of kin of the brain- dead donor – a Defence Security Corps personnel – embarked on this noble gesture of donating his organs after being declared brain death.

The first successful liver harvest from a brain-dead donor in northern Indian region was carried out on Wednesday by a multi-disciplinary team of surgeons and anesthesiologists led by the chief of gastrointestinal surgery of Command Hospital.



A military spokesperson on Friday said the Western Command Hospital has taken the lead in the task of trying to reduce the agony of terminally ill patients awaiting extremely scarce commodity of transplantable organs.



Naik Narender Singh, a serving DSC soldier, was admitted to the hospital ICU in deep coma and declared brain dead after a series of tests by interventionists and neuro-physicians.



After obtaining consent from relatives, a marathon surgery was carried out on Wednesday evening. The liver, kidneys and cornea were harvested.



The army spokesperson said the family of the brain-dead donor, who consented for multiple organ harvesting, deserve recognition and gratitude for this selfless act of courage, who even in the moment of extreme personal grief gave a lease of life to at least three terminally ill patients.



The liver and kidneys were flown the same evening by a special Indian Air Force aircraft to the Army Hospital Research and Referral in New Delhi for the benefit of patients with end-stage liver and kidney diseases.



Brain-dead soldier gifts life to others, kin donate his organs



:india::india:





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Friday 28 November 2014

Army to train students in border areas? http://ift.tt/1rDnZ9u

India could start some element of military training for its youth, especially in border areas, but compulsory training on the lines of Russia and other countries is ruled out.



Under the programme, which could be launched on trial basis in border areas, military training could be imparted for an hour or as a separate course as part of school and college curriculum, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar told the Rajya Sabha today.



"It can be introduced as an hour in a course or as a separate course. We can work out something like that. We can start on a trial basis. Let us do in some districts in borders where there is more enthusiasm," he said while replying to a debate on a private member's bill.



"After consulting members, something will be worked out, may be in few months," he added.



The bill, moved by BJP member Avinash Rai Khanna during last session of Parliament, proposed one-year compulsory military training in the age group of 14-15. It was defeated by voice vote.



Supporting the intent of the proposal in the bill, Parrikar, however, said compulsory military training was not possible in view of the huge costs of the tune of Rs 60,000 crore each year.



"...I would have supported the bill had I been sitting there (in opposition), but I am sitting on this side in government ....I will support the bill but I will point out issues which will create problems," he said.



"The idea is excellent but the bill needs to be withdrawn as it is not possible to provide compulsory military training in age group of 14-15," he said.



Khanna was not present in the House for withdrawing the bill because of which it was put to vote.



Explaining how the proposal was "not physically possible", Parrikar said if the country has 16 crore youth in that age group and half of them are fit for training, it will cost the exchequer Rs 60,000 crore each year. There will also be problems on account of infrastructure and resources.



The Defence Minister objected to a member's contention that poor youth join military for livelihood. "Though I do agree that some consider it as 'rozi-roti' (livelihood), I disagree that youth join army to get killed for 'rozi-roti'. There has to be some pride."



Asserting that nation-building and character development does not happen by military training alone, Parrikar said education system must do so, but "our teaching has slipped."



The National Cadet Corps (NCC) training too has "diluted" although the strength has increased to 15.18 lakh now from 13.8 lakh 3-4 years back, he added.



"The kind of NCC we used to have earlier is not today. It is diluted," the minister said, while disclosing that he too had to clear a course on NCC to complete his IIT.



He also shared that he wanted to join National Defence Academy as youth but could not for some reasons.



Participating in a debate, V P Singh Badnore (BJP) said 50 per cent of the countries have military conscription, which is compulsory enrolment of persons for military service.



"In India, we must have this for many reasons. ...You can have selective conscription," he said and suggested the government to divert some MNREGA and NCC funds for this.



Veer Singh and Mansukh L Mandaviya (both BJP) said it was a must for inculcating discipline, patriotism and nationalism among children.



Bhupinder Singh (BJD) and Chaudhary Munavver Saleem (SP) too supported the bill saying this would guide the youth towards nationalism and eliminate the problems like extremism and separatism.



Ram Gopal Yadav (SP) said the resolution should be taken seriously even if the bill not not passed. Satyanarayan Jaitya (BJP) also participated in the debate.



Military Training Could Be Made a Part of the Curriculum: Govt





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Thursday 27 November 2014

Captured Terrorist Weapons by Indian Army http://ift.tt/1ruj9LI

The thread for posting photos of Captured weapons from terrorist by Indian Army or Paramilitary and discussing them ..



Happy Posting !





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Wednesday 26 November 2014

India may pull in Israeli IMI for next tank Project http://ift.tt/1zvtcyA

According to Israeli media report India might rope in Israeli Military Industries (IMI) for joint partnership in the design and development of the proposed homemade future main battle tank and setting up a facility to jointly manufacture a variety of ammunition , India recently quietly lifted a ban on Israeli Military Industries (IMI) which it had imposed few years back due to corruption charges against them.



In past IMI has worked with India on development of Arjun tanks . Indian army has still not cleared if new tank will be follow up of Arjun MK-2 tank or they want all new tank similar to weight class of T-90 . DRDO carried out third-party evaluation after disputes with Indian army emerged on performance of Arjun tanks, IMI was roped in which endorsed Arjun tanks performance has Excellent and on par with Tanks which are made in Israel . Israeli experts were also of the opinion that Arjun would outrun any competition, including Russian built T-90 tanks which are also in Indian Army’s Arsenal .After blacklisting IMI consultation for Arjun tank was curtailed but now India likely will re-engage with them soon .



India may pull in Israeli IMI for next tank Project | idrw.org





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